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INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSATLANTIC
IMAGES OF BELONGING:
THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
IN THE 21ST CENTURY
JOHN A. HALL
This topic was suggested to me by a fellow academic. Other-
directedness has normally appealed to me in intellectual affairs, for
it has encouraged thought on subjects otherwise not on my agenda.
But I am uncomfortable on this occasion. Explaining why I feel as
if I have been offered what chess players’ refer to as a poisoned
pawn allows immediate highlighting of the argument to be made.
 This research area seems to rest on a particular set of assump-
tions. Belonging needs to be reimagined because the world has
changed. The nation-state is being hollowed out by global forces,
making traditional national identities less and less adequate. That
one response to such globalization has been the creation of narrow
and vicious nationalisms lends to the task of reimagining consider-
able moral urgency. There is a good deal of sense to this implicit
sociology, so reminiscent of Benjamin Barber’s contrast between
Jihad and McWorld (Barber, 1996)—although vicious nationalism
has perhaps been the norm rather than the exception within Euro-
pean history. In these circumstances, it makes obvious sense to
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think about transatlantic images of belonging. Vast movements of
people and capital, membership of international regimes and the
legacies of a single civilisation almost dictate thinking about iden-
tities other than the national. As I was born in England but have
lived for many years in the United States and Canada, it might seem
that I exemplify my subject. So I have been offered the seemingly
seductive proposal of doing sociology by talking about myself—for
I am the evidence of what they seek to establish.
I have neither a reckless desire to bite the hand that feeds me
nor any wish to deny novelties to contemporary social conditions,
but nonetheless kick against these pricks. More is involved than
distaste for talking about myself. Basic mapping of the terrain to do
with transatlantic images of belonging suggests considerations that
run counter to the assumptions identified. Much depends upon draw-
ing a distinction between two senses of transatlantic belonging: on
the one side is membership in a transatlantic political entity, whether
formal or informal, whilst on the other is a sense of belonging to a
society other than that of the nation-state in which one resides. The
first two parts of this paper offer some consideration of these two
topics, evidence being drawn—regrettably—from North rather than
from South America. Concluding comments offer more general reflec-
tions on global processes, the putative decline of the nation-state and
the position of the United States within the world’s political economy.
Two conceptual points should be borne in mind. First, parti-
cular attention is paid to a broad range of social identities. The vast
majority of social interaction in the historical record has been local;
the creation of national patterns of interaction is accordingly quin-
tessentially modern. Where national identity is passive, nationalist
identity is active—especially because it has ideas about the proper
conduct of geopolitics. The determination to establish that the
nation has its proper ‘place in the sun’ can and has led to conflict
with those with internationalist identities. In late nineteenth cen-
tury Europe, nationalists sought to control and cage foreign-policy
making elites whose behavior was held to be altogether too inter-
nationally responsible. Finally, international interaction and iden-
tity is, although this is not always appreciated, different from the
truly transnational (Mann, 1993). Second, a warning is in order
about the celebrated notion of social construction. Everything in
social life, and not just nationalism, is socially constructed. But to
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leave matters at this point can lead to licentious voluntarism, that
is, to the implicit belief that anything can be constructed at any
time. Nothing could be further from the truth: social structures
limit and select ideological innovation. Attention here will certainly
be given to structural as much as to ideological forces.
Membership in Transatlantic Entities
The broad claim to be defended here is simple: membership within
transatlantic political entities has declined quite markedly in the
modern world. Let us consider formal transatlantic entities to begin
with, in general terms and by means of a single example, and then
turn to more recent, novel informal arrangements. The latter have
considerable importance but they need to be characterized properly.
Historians now pay much attention to the Atlantic society and
economy of the early eighteenth century (e.g., Langley, 1996). The
first British empire was, unlike its later successor, very profitable,
and the same was true for the early years of French and Spanish
transatlantic structures of domination. The British case is especially
interesting in the key matter that concerns us. The inhabitants of
the Colonies were distinctively British. One way in which this can
be seen in the cultural patterning of the United States. Bernard
Bailyn has demonstrated ideological continuity, whilst David
Hackett Fischer’s monumental work shows the re-creation in the
New World of very varied social patterns, from architecture and
familial life to political attitudes and leadership styles (Bailyn, 1968:
Fischer, 1989). More importantly, rebellion occurred in large part
because of colonial loyalty to the ideals of the homeland. The move
from being the best Englishmen to becoming Americans took
place as the result of the conflict; it was consequence not cause.
The destruction of the Spanish and British transatlantic empires is
generally best explained in terms of the limit to the logistics of rule
imposed by geography and composite construction—although acci-
dents (Britain fought without allies, Spain was debilitated by Napo-
leon) played some part. But the precise cause does not matter here.
The analytic point is that belonging became national, nationalist
and international rather than transatlantic. Bluntly, this must be
true: without this development, the novels of Henry James—to
take an obvious example—would simply not make sense.
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This point can be made with more force and sophistication by
considering the very recent history of Canada, certainly from Con-
federation in 1867 to the First World War and perhaps even to the
1960s. Here was a country with a state but without a national
identify of its own. This is not for a moment to say that there was
no sense of identity present within Canada. If Québécois identity
was in large part inward looking, the same is not true for what is
now known as the Rest of Canada. Here identity had a predomi-
nantly transatlantic character, as firmly as was the case for the
members of the American colonies in the early eighteenth century.
The proof of loyalty was of course paid in blood, in the Boer War
and still more so in two world wars. Three points are worth making
here about the working of this transatlantic entity (Cannadine,
1997). First, the economic development of Canada, the shipping
lines and the railways, depended upon capital provided by London.
More than 70% of the 500 million pounds sterling absorbed between
1900 and 1914 came from Britain. Second, Canada provided job
opportunities for the highest level of the metropolitan aristocracy.
One Governor-General, Lord Lorne, was Queen Victoria’s son-in-
law. Another, the Duke of Connaught, was her favourite son.
Third, the imperial connection allowed for quite remarkable social
mobility for colonials within the metropolis. Two examples make
this point. Let us consider first Donald Alexander Smith, who arrived
in Canada, a penniless Scot in 1838. For twenty-six years he
worked in the Hudson’s Bay Company. He then moved to Mon-
treal, and became a major figure in the Canadian Pacific Railway
and in national politics. In 1895, when already long past seventy,
he became the official representative of Canada in London, where
he died in 1914—to the considerable irritation of Sir Frederick
Borden, the famous Minister of Militia and Defence, who had sought
to succeed him (Miller, 1997). Smith piled up colossal wealth, was
ennobled as Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal and lived in great
state on both sides of the Atlantic. He was Chancellor of McGill
University; he equipped at his own cost a troop of horses during
the Boer War; he presided in London at an annual banquet each
July 1st to celebrate Canadian Confederation; and he spent 40,000
pounds sterling to celebrate his Lord Rectorship of Aberdeen Uni-
versity. A second case is that of William Maxwell Aitken. Within a
decade of his arrival in Britain, Aitken was a member of parliament,
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a baronet, a peer, the owner of Express newspapers and the friend
and confidant of that other son of the Canadian manse, Andrew
Bonar Law—who became Prime Minister (in contrast to Aitken
himself whose highest political post was that of Minister of Aircraft
Production in 1940). The causes to which Aitken was attracted—
Empire Free Trade in the 1930’s and opposition to entry in the
Common Market, together with deep antipathy to Lord Mount-
batten on the grounds that he gave away India, the jewel of the
empire as a whole—were characteristic of this transatlantic world.
Bluntly, he loved the British empire more than did the British
themselves.
It would be easy to go on, and at length, describing mechanisms
of connection or recounting biographical details. Further, the
historic pattern has scarcely completely ended. An old joke about
Pierre Trudeau had it that the history of Canada would have been
very different had he taken his theory of nationalism from Ernest
Gellner rather than from Elie Kedourie whilst he was a student at
the London School of Economics. Equally, such contemporary public
intellectuals as Michael Ignatieff and James Tully gained much of
their intellectual capital at the University of Cambridge. Still, the
analytic point to be made remains the same as for the first British
and the Spanish Atlantic empires. This transatlantic entity has by
and large come to an end. There is at least a Canadian national
anthem (or, rather, two of them), the constitution has (at last for
every province except Quebec) been repatriated, and it would not
surprise me were a republican movement to arise in the future to
echo the one that is now making inroads in Australia. Perhaps the
general point is best made with reference to two contemporary
figures. James Tully—a distinguished figure and friend —is not a
Briton who happens to be living in Canada. Whilst he doubtless
has multiple identities, it looks as if his strongest desire to create
a new, sophisticated, open and tolerant Canadian national identity;
in the final analysis his identify is not transatlantic, but internatio-
nal, national and occasionally nationalist. Conrad Black, the owner
of Britain’s The Daily Telegraph, illuminates matters by sheer
contrast. His status as Aitken’s presumptive heir seemed assured in
1999 when the British government offered him a peerage. But the
Canadian government (whose Prime Minister has reason to dislike
the newspaper tycoon) refused to allow him, as a Canadian citizen,
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to accept this honour. National identity has trumped this transat-
lantic political entity.
Let me turn to informal transatlantic identities. It may be
useful to begin with to say that such identities most certainly have
made an impact on the historical record. International relations
scholars like to point to the transfer of power between Britain and
the United States at the end of the nineteenth century as perhaps
the sole example of a peaceful hegemonic transition within the
history of the world polity. This transition was certainly eased by
geography, but it depended upon shared liberal norms (Doyle,
1983)—and perhaps still more on shared Anglo-Saxon habit (Mann,
1993). Kipling lived in Vermont for a long period, knew Mahan
and Teddy Roosevelt, and eventually felt as at home with the key
figures in Great Britain’s military apparatus, Lords Fisher and Esher.
This background transatlantic identity most certainly did a great
deal to allow for the creation of a strategy to counter Imperial Ger-
many. A division of military labor meant in particular that Britain
could concentrate on designing plans to bottle up the German fleet
so as to starve the German population into submission (Offer,
1989).
Is there any more recent equivalent to this situation? The least
that can be said about the Atlantic Community was that an
attempt was made to create an extensive transatlantic identity (Cf.
Schaeper and Schaeper, 1998). All those CIA funded Congresses
for Cultural Freedom sought to cement a shared identity, an enter-
prise in a sense personified in the vigorous figure of Edward Shils—
resident for most of his life half a year in Chicago and half a year
at the University of Cambridge. Still, how extensive and deep was
this identity? It is worth keeping at the centre of one’s mind that
identities habitually involve some sort of mix between interest and
affect. Is emotional attachment as strong in the Atlantic Commu-
nity as it was amongst Anglo-Saxons at the turn of the century? Let
us consider the most powerful transatlantic link—the ‘Special Rela-
tionship’ between the United States and Great Britain—before
characterizing the nature of the Atlantic community as a whole.
The Special Relationship has received enormous attention, not
surprisingly since it is with us still. One of the earliest architects
was Winston Churchill. The fact that his mother was American
lends authenticity to the notion of a transatlantic identity. Still, his
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behavior as First Lord of the Admiralty and as Prime Minister had
quite as much at its core the pragmatic desire to extend British
power by means of the American connection. Calculation seems
stronger still in Harold Macmillan’s celebrated words to Richard
Crossman while attached to Eisenhower’s headquarters in Algiers
in 1942: ‘[We] are the Greeks in this American empire. You will
find the Americans much as the Greeks found the Romans—great
big, bustling people, more vigorous than we are and also more idle,
with more unspoiled virtues but also more corrupt. We must run
[this HQ] as the Greek slaves ran the operations of the Emperor
Claudius’ (Horne, 1988, p. 160). This same vein was struck by
Keynes, when commenting to his staff before beginning meetings
about the British loan ‘they may have all the money, but we’ve got
all the brains’.1
If we now revert to continental European cases, the air of
calculation rather than of shared identity comes to the fore. As an
intellectual, Raymond Aron, despite his fabulous intelligence and
carefully nurtured American relationships, was first and foremost
French. In more political terms, the ‘empire by invitation’ that is
NATO resulted from the famous calculation, coined by Lord Ismay,
that it was necessary ‘to keep the Russians out, the Americans in
and Germany down’ (Lundestad, 1986). A similar point must be
made about the nature of transatlantic relations in general, to whose
characterisation we can now turn.
Nationalist geopolitics in the period from 1870-1945 produced,
as noted, genuine anarchy in the international system. In these
conditions, it made sense to grab territory; nationalism became
inextricably linked with imperialism for only extensive territory
could secure supplies and markets. The resolution of Europe’s
security dilemma after 1945 broke this connection. A very parti-
cular transatlantic society was created. There are now frequent
1. I heard this story from James Meade. Though I have learnt a great deal
from K. Phillip’s The Cousins’s Wars (1999), the thesis of that book—that
there is a united Anglo-America—does not convince this British subject
for a simple reason, namely that there have been many occasions when the
United States has chosen to act alone. This was true of the shaping of the
postwar architecture of the international economy with which Keynes was
involved. Equally, Mrs Thatcher was apparently only told about the bomb-
ing raid on Libya when American planes were airborne.
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meetings of the leaders of the Atlantic states, but key transatlantic
(and international) institutions are dominated in the last resort by
the leading power. This is obviously true of NATO whose com-
manding officer is, has been, and it is safe to say always will be an
American. Europeans have realized that the United States has solved
their security dilemma, have occasionally shared anti-communist
attitudes, and are well aware that the benefit of being geopolitically
supine is their considerable affluence. Nonetheless, the fact that
interest in international cooperation is not any automatic or
unquestioning transatlantic identity can be seen in endless quibbles
and in pervasive anti-Americanism. Still, the pretense is that of com-
munity, and so it hurts—especially in London—when the United
States acts unilaterally, as it does whenever anything of consequence
to its own interests is at stake.
The most striking recent portrait of American-European rela-
tions, that of Steve Walt’s ‘The Ties that Fray’ (1998/9), suggests
that interests have now diverged to such an extent as to destroy
any continuing sense of community. It is certainly true that trade
between America and Europe is not great (with the United States
alone having the option of isolationism), and that economic interests,
both in agriculture and in communicative technologies, diverge
sharply. All of this will lead, and in the eyes of commentators in
addition to Walt, to an economic challenge spearheaded by the new
Euro. Further, Europeans calculate the threats in the Middle and
Near East in a manner all their own, and clearly resent being subject
to American meddling—with the same applying with still greater
force in cultural affairs. Despite the cogency of these points, Walt
seems to me to be quite wrong. Given that calculation rather than
community ruled in the first instance, there is more evidence of
continuity than he allows. There is no sign of any real challenge to
the United States, much as I might like it, and a good deal to suggest
the exact opposite. Who would have predicted, for example, that
France would effectively rejoin NATO—a move calculated to balance
united Germany by strengthening the American involvement?
Does anybody really think it likely that Europe’s status as econo-
mic giant and military worm will change? Has not the timing of
actions in the erstwhile Yugoslavia been dependent, for better and
for worse, upon what happens in Washington? And is it really likely
that the Euro, which of course at this moment seems so weak, can
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triumph over the dollar, when the United States remains the pro-
vider of geopolitical security?
It is worth trying to highlight the central contention made to
this point. Transatlantic political entities are weaker than they once
were. On the one hand, formal political entities have disappeared.
On the other hand, the large element of calculation in transatlantic
relations means that the taken-for-granted quality inherent in the
very notion of identity is somewhat lacking.2 Still, this diminished
condition looks, in the absence of any alternative, rather durable.
But this is a first approximation; more will be said about the United
States.
Belongings Beyond One’s Nation-State
A proper investigation of images of belonging to social worlds
outside one’s own state or nation-state would of course be vast. An
enormous amount could be said about the images of the other
held by people, differentially divided by class, religion and ethni-
city, on different sides of the Atlantic. Much here has little to do
with belonging. Still less prominent is accuracy of perception. It is
difficult for me to describe the loathing that I feel for much BBC
drama, so often featuring effete members of the aristocracy, pro-
duced for American consumption. This makes a good deal of money,
and justifies American views of the backwardness of Britain—but at
the expense of any sense of what actually happens in that country.
Other images do have much more to do with a sense of belonging,
not least amongst American intellectuals—names could be given—
who dream of the Café Flore. However, rather than concentrate
on such images let me, so to speak, raise the bar higher so as to
ask not just about dreams but instead about what might be called
networks of interaction—by which is meant those belongings that
affect actions rather than dreams.
There is of course nothing novel about the presence of net-
works of interaction that transcend borders. In medieval Europe,
the larger identities of feudalism and of Christianity for centuries
transcended states; similar points can be made about most of the
2. It may be sensible to emphasise that pure affective identity can and does
matter in contemporary Europe. The most obvious example is the desire
of many citizens in Central Europe to ‘rejoin Europe’.
14 E
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSATLANTIC IMAGES OF BELONGING
world religions, whilst intellectuals quite often have more alle-
giance to their fellows than to the state in which they live. Still, the
standard generalisation of historical sociology has been that the rise
of the nation-state has increasingly caged social interactions within
its borders. This has overwhelmingly been true of the means of
violence: there have been few Wallensteins since the seventeenth
century, although it is true that the career of Juan Peron cannot
be understood without knowledge of his period of residence in
fascist Europe. In the period between 1870 and, say, 1958, capi-
talists were similarly caged, although I will argue later that their
later release is not as great as is often imagined—and that, at least
in Europe, it results less from the defeat of the state than from
deliberate state design. Whilst bearing these points in mind, let us
concentrate most on peoples. Is it the case that the classical immi-
grant experience—in which one assimilated, at considerable cost,
to the host national culture—has come to an end? Are diasporas
now so well connected by cheap travel and the internet that homo-
geneous national entities can no longer be created? This brings us
to key theoretical debates. Bluntly, how much of the ideas of
postnationalist and of multiculturalism should we accept?
There most certainly are cases where the extensive search of a
diaspora matters for very practical reasons, as most obviously was
and is true for the overseas Chinese—many of whom live in genui-
nely multicultural settings. Is there any transatlantic equivalent?
Let us consider Europe and the United States in turn.
At the end of the nineteenth century, the United States was
the stuff of which dreams were made of, both for peasants in
Central and Southern Europe and for the persecuted from regions
further to the East. Histories of immigration show that there was
much more movement back and forward than we now realise, with
perhaps fifty per cent of Italians who came to the United States
returning when economic conditions proved too adverse. This is
evidence of an extensive network before the era of modern com-
munications, although it is far from sure that this amounted to a
genuine transatlantic identity. Irish immigration to the United
States in the last thirty years has had a similar character. But the
blunt fact is that Europe no longer provides the bulk of immi-
grants to the United States. American racism of course closed off
southern and eastern Europe in 1924. More importantly, most of
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the nation-states of Europe have made themselves attractive places
in which to live, with industrialisation now capable of absorbing
populations once forced to migrate. Tourism to the United States
from across the Atlantic booms, but a transatlantic identity based
in Europe does not seem on the cards.
There certainly are cases in North America where an image of
transatlantic belonging matters. Capital, the human capital of the
young trained in computer technology, and political leadership has
come, with varying degrees of benefit, to the Baltics and to the
Balkans from the United States. But we need to be very careful
before saying that transatlantic belongings are generally strong and
on the increase. Three considerations should be borne in mind.
First, what is at issue at times is longing rather than belonging: it
seems to me to be the case that the Québécois often feel rejected
and jilted by the French, who rarely go to live there—often pre-
ferring to make jokes about their accent. Secondly, it is very
important to note that the images of belonging are imaginary, and
that the process of imagining distinctively reflects American culture
rather than any primordial identity. The spaghetti with meatballs
that marks Italian-American culture is unknown in Italy; more
importantly, the support given by Irish-Americans to NORAID
was quite often an extreme embarrassment to Irish citizens,
amongst them the members of the rock band U2—who famously
and very bravely criticized their ‘fellows’ in this regard. Third,
transatlantic identities are simply not present at all in key circum-
stances. Recent years have seen the emergence of non-ethnic white
Americans, present in striking numbers in the mid-West, who no
longer make any pretense at having a transatlantic identity. More
controversially, it is worth pointing out the huge difference that
exists between African-Americans and Afro-Americans. Except for
some very striking exceptions, it is by and large true to say that
Afro-Americans have no particular loyalty or link to Africa. There
is a vast body of evidence showing that Afro-Americans share main-
stream American values, and wish for nothing more than to be full
members of their own society—making it all the more cruel, of
course, that they cannot gain proper entry into mainstream Ameri-
can society.
It is well worth while pausing to consider the United States in
a little more detail, not least as this society, the largest and most
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powerful in the transatlantic world, is the source of recent claims
about multiculturalism and postnationality. The central point to be
made is that diversity was once much greater in the United States
than it is today. Two points should be borne in mind. On the one
hand, the United States in 1920 boasted 276 newspapers in Ger-
man, 118 in Spanish or Portuguese, 111 in Scandinavian languages,
98 in Italian, 76 in Polish, 51 in Czech or Slovak, 46 in French,
42 in Slovenian and 39 in Yiddish—together with the genuinely
different culture of the Solid South (Lind, 1995, p. 75). All of this
has of course gone. On the other hand, brilliant research by Mary
Waters has demonstrated both that ethnicity is no longer a cage
but rather an option—and one, it should be noted, that has asto-
nishingly little actual substance (Waters, 1990). This latter point is
not to say for a moment that the constructed identity is not some-
how real and important: very much to the contrary, to have an
ethnic identity is now almost a constitutional right. But the point
about the politics of difference is that so many people are demand-
ing recognition: that so many ask for the same thing is an astonishing
demonstration of the continuing powers of American nationalising
homogeneity—for all but Afro-Americans (Hall and Lindholm,
1999). Furthermore, difference is entertained only so far as it is, so
to speak, toilet-trained and American: it is fine to express one’s
Asian background by wearing a Sari when graduating from high
school—but only on the condition that one does not take caste
seriously. As this is view is contentious, not to say unpopular, it is
worth justifying. Consider that research on Hispanics shows that they
are no different from previous immigrants: Cuban-Americans in
Florida have out-marriage rates of above 50% within a single gene-
ration, together with a set of attitudes in tune with those of the
larger society.3 Perhaps this should not surprise us. It remains the
case that immigrants are attracted to the United States because of
the opportunities for social mobility that an ever more powerful
and nationally integrated capitalist culture offers. If that is to say
that the immigrants who come to the United States are self-select-
ed in such a way as to reinforce core American beliefs, there should
be no gainsaying of the other side of the picture. Apparently a
3. This figure is drawn from the unpublished research of Elizabeth Arias,
Department of Sociology, State University of New York at Stony Brook.
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stump speech directed against Ann Richards when running to be
Governor of Texas had it that ‘if English is good enough for Jesus
Christ, it is good enough for Texas’. Poll evidence shows very, very
high levels of opposition in the United States for any general
recognition of a second official language; the votes against such
recognition in California are thus entirely representative of strong
external pressures placed on immigrants (Wolfe, 1998). All of this
can be summarised in the starkest possible terms: no real transat-
lantic identity will develop from the United States, which will
remain a great engine for creating Americans.
Conclusion: the Globe, the Nation-State and the United States
This paper began by noting the prominence of a general sociological
view in which the nation-state seen is held to have been hollowed
out both from above and from below. It may be useful to end by
making some general points about this, not least as hints have been
given of my own considerable scepticism to this position. Some
cursory comments about the globe, the nation-state and the United
States may be enough to give cause for thought.
We should not all be globalisers now for a whole set of reasons
(Hall, 2000). First, trading patterns go against any naive view of the
globe as the key economic unit (Wade, 1996). World trade has only
just regained the level of 1913, with most of the increase since
1945 anyway being due most of all to the removal of tariffs within
Europe. Further, between 1970 and 1990 the share of the North
within world trade increased from 81-84%; importantly, the United
States trades only 12% of its GDP—with only 3% of its GDP being
involved with the developing world. Second, foreign direct invest-
ment patterns show both that external investments—anyway small
as a proportion of home capital—go very largely to the North rather
than to the South. Third, the most striking research on firms
suggests that we should speak of NFIO’s rather than TNCs or
MNCs, that is, of national firms with international operations
rather than transnational or multinational corporations. Profits are
still repatriated to the home base, with management reflecting
national ownership more and more strongly as one mounts the
corporate ladder. Fourth, technological innovation, measured by
research and development spending and the taking of patents,
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continues to reflect the historical differences of nation-states. Fifth,
restrictions on labor, to some extent in the United States but much
more so in Europe, look set to increase, whilst those of Japan do
not look as if they are about to diminish: it is this evidence that
makes me doubt the case for post-nationalism. To be set against
all this, of course, is the undoubted speed with which money now
flows around the world. But here too reservations are in order:
stock markets remain very largely national, whilst the floating of
currencies reflects the interests of the United States quite a s much
as any global logic of its own.
We should be equally cautious when assessing the powers of
the nation-state. States within capitalism have rarely had and have
rarely sought total control over their destinies. Historical awareness
makes one realise that states are very adaptable, with the loss of
power in one arena often being compensated for by an increase
elsewhere—as is the case now, for the penetrative power of the
state is increasing for all that some monetary powers are being
abandoned. Are European states less powerful now that they have
been humbled by the attempts made between 1870 and 1945 to
become total power containers? Is not less more? Exactly how
many states are really challenged seriously from below? Were not
the great secessionist drives of the last years directed only against
the last great empire, that of the Soviet Union? Serious analysis
makes one realise that the European Union has depended at all
times on the motor of the Franco-German alliance—something
which goes some way to suggesting that the future of the Union
is likely to remain international rather than transnational (Milward,
1992). If the nation-state is still present in Europe, where one can
at least argue about new forces, there is little likelihood of it sud-
denly collapsing in the United States or Japan. The only place where
states are collapsing is in sub-Saharan Africa. Awareness of this
should make us realise how provincial is much Western commentary
when speaking about the state: much of the world needs the
powers of the state to increase.
The final general point can be made quickly for it is implicit
in much of what has been said already. A measure of order in the
world comes from the re-creation of international society. But behind
that remains the huge powers of the most powerful state the world
has yet seen. In retrospect we can see (what in fact could be seen
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at the time) that the debate about American decline was utterly
misconceived. Only the United States has military, cultural, mone-
tary, economic and ideological force of primary weight in the con-
temporary world. One sign of the supremacy of the United States
is the simple fact that it has the ability to run a continual trading
imbalance with the rest of the world. The current account of the
United States is balanced by borrowing most of the excess capital
of the world economy. Such capital is available, it has been argued
(Wade and Veneroso, 1998), because of the American insistence
on the opening of financial markets—an opening, it should be
noted, that helped to cause and certainly to exacerbate the Asian
crisis of the late 1990s. This suggests a final thought. The inhabi-
tants of the Beltway do not really possess any transatlantic identity,
thereby making traditional realist concepts all-too-relevant. But the
fact that much of the motion of modernity is now determined, for
better or worse, in Washington means that it behooves Europeans
to have a transatlantic awareness (and much of the rest of the
world to have international awareness)—even though they lack
much sense of transatlantic belonging.
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